






Debunking Millar v Taylor: the History of the Prohibition of Legislative History
John J. Magyar​[1]​
 4.1 	Introduction
The rule prohibiting recourse to legislative history​[2]​ as an aid to statutory interpretation has a long history in common law jurisdictions. It was essentially dogma in England and much of the Commonwealth for the better part of the 20th century, and in the 19th century, it also had carriage in the United States. It is widely accepted that the rule began in the 18th century with the now infamous case of Millar v Taylor.​[3]​ Justice Frankfurter’s view is representative: 
In Millar v. Taylor the principle of construction was laid down in words, which have never, so far as I know, been seriously challenged, by Willes J. as long ago as in 1769: ‘The sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into law; and not from the history of changes it underwent in the house where it took its rise.’​[4]​
This claim has been repeated by scholars such as Odgers, Craies, Bennion, Vogenaur and relatively recently by Scalia and Garner.​[5]​ However, if one reads the entirety of Millar v Taylor, and places it within the context of the relevant cases and secondary literature in the 18th and 19th centuries, the simple narrative that the rule began with that case and was strictly followed thereafter in England and the United States through to the 20th century, becomes destabilised. The reality is more complex. The emergence of the rule is less clear, and one finds considerable disagreement about the rule and the exceptions to it. Meanwhile, the development and decline of the rule followed a different timeline in England, in the US federal courts, and in the state courts. 
In order to arrive at a more enlightened understanding of this rule, some historical context needs to be set out with respect to the nature of the preparatory materials available to the legal community in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Then, the text of Millar v Taylor and its use as precedent in the 19th century will be examined. The arguments in support of the claim that the exclusionary rule began with Millar v Taylor will be considered, and this will be followed by an examination of the claims about the rule in the better-known treatises on statutory interpretation published in the 19th century in England and America. Significant attention will be devoted to the cases cited as authorities in these treatises. The analysis will occur in three stages. The first stage focuses on the development of the rule in the first four treatises. The second stage examines the decline of the rule in the state courts and the federal courts of the United States. The third stage focuses on the uncertainty that the rule faced in England around the turn of the 20th century. 
 4.2 	Early Judicial Encounters with Legislative History
In the 19th century, judges and the authors of treatises on statutory interpretation presumed that various types of materials could not be considered unless there were prior cases demonstrating acceptability. The contemporaneous construction rule permitted reliance on how an older statute was understood “by the members of the legal profession who lived at or near the time.”​[6]​ Judges were also entitled to take judicial notice of historical facts at the time of a statute’s enactment.​[7]​ However the notion of judicial notice of historical facts was vague, particularly with respect to scope. There was no explicit rule governing what constituted a legitimate source of historical facts. As one would expect in a common law system, different judges dealt with the rule differently. There were judges who felt that the statute must speak for itself. In so doing, they followed the principle of minimalism and took the view that one could not venture beyond the statute regardless, (although they would consider the writings of canonical legal scholars such as Coke and Blackstone). There were also judges who felt the need for further information in the face of unclear text. These judges applied the rule more permissively, and occasionally relied on documents like commissioners’ reports, Bills, and petitions to the legislature, often by way of asserting an exception, for example, under the mischief rule.​[8]​
Judges were deemed to have knowledge of the law, and had to take notice of enacted statutes. Because of this, parliamentary process was relevant when statutory issues arose in court proceedings.​[9]​ It is therefore unsurprising that arguments supported by commissioners’ reports and proceedings in the legislature were heard in court in England with a certain amount of regularity in the late 18th and early 19th centuries.​[10]​ In England, the practice dates back at least to the 1760s.​[11]​ Statements made in the House of Commons and inferences drawn from changes made to a Bill were relied upon in Entick v Carrington,​[12]​ and changes made to a bill as it moved through Parliament were relied upon in Millar v Taylor.
Prior to 1783, it was illegal to publish reports on deliberations in the houses of Parliament, although it had occurred for centuries.​[13]​ Originally, false names were used to protect the publishers, but reports with proper names commenced in 1771.​[14]​ The reporters were partisan: their reports were unreliable. Nonpartisan reporting commenced in 1803 when a publisher names Cobbet combined reports from the opposing factions.​[15]​ In the US, systematic private publication of the congressional floor debates commenced in 1834.​[16]​ It should be kept in mind that the journals of the legislatures, which documented procedural steps, did not suffer from these shortcomings.
The available records indicate that the libraries at some of the Inns of Court contained extensive collections of the journals and reports of debates of the Houses of Parliament by the 19th century. According to an 1806 catalogue, the Inner Temple library contained debates from the houses of Parliament from 1640–1801.​[17]​ An 1845 catalogue of the Middle Temple library lists debates in House of Commons from 1667–1694, the debates in Parliament published by Johnson in 1787 and Hansard’s Debates from 1803–1844. These materials were becoming more widely available to members of the legal community around this time, and with the benefit of hindsight, it was inevitable that judges would develop rules governing their use. However, the treatises on statutory interpretation did not discuss rules of statutory interpretation governing legislative history until the second half of the 19th century.​[18]​
This detail deserves emphasis. The orthodox belief is that reliance upon Hansard was forbidden in the Courts of England beginning with the case of Millar v Taylor in 1769. However, the first treatise in which this claim appeared was by Craies’, published in 1907.​[19]​ This, despite the fact that, if revised and annotated editions are included, more than a dozen treatises had been published previously in England and America.​[20]​ Over time this claim was repeated in journal articles and textbooks, and by the second half of the 20th century, it became a dogma. One may wonder why this case was not cited in support of this claim earlier. The next section will ovver a plausible explanation. 
 4.3 	Mr. Justice Willes’ Statement in Millar v Taylor in Context
Mr Justice Willes’ opinion in Millar v Taylor does contain the famous passage quoted earlier: “The sense and meaning of an Act of Parliament must be collected from what it says when passed into a law; and not from the history of changes it underwent in the house where it took its rise.”​[21]​ However, this statement was an introduction to the legal analysis upon which the decision was based. The issue concerned whether or not there was copyright in perpetuity at common law prior to the enactment of the Statute of Anne.​[22]​ A few paragraphs after his now infamous statement, Mr Justice Willes said the following: 
The preamble is definitely stronger in the original bill, as it was brought into the House, and referred to the committee.
But to go into the history of the changes the bill underwent in the House of Commons.– It certainly went to the committee, as a bill to secure the undoubted property of copies for ever. It is plain, that objections arose in committee, to the generality of the proposition; which ended in securing the property of copies for a term; without prejudice to either side of the question upon the general proposition as to the right.
By the law and usage of Parliament, a new bill cannot be made in a committee: a bill to secure the property of authors could not be turned into a bill to take it away. And therefore this is not to be supposed, though there had been no proviso saving their rights.
What the Act gives with a sanction of penalties, is for a term; and the words ‘and no longer,’ add nothing to the sense; any more than they would in a will, if a testator gave for years. Yet, probably, these words occasioned the express proviso being afterwards added; from the anxiety of the university-members, who knew the universities had many copies. The University of Oxford had published Lord Clarendon’s History in three volumes, but about five years before; and had the property of the copy.​[23]​
Mr Justice Wills concluded, based on these and other reasons, that there had been perpetual copyright at common law prior to the statute which was not extinguished by the statute. He was the junior-most judge on a panel of four. His opinion was followed by that of Mr Justice Aston, who concurred with Mr Justice Willes and made further comments on the parliamentary deliberations:
This Act was brought in at the solicitation of authors, booksellers and printers, but principally of the two latter; not from any doubt or distrust of a just and legal property in the works or copy-right, (as appears by the petition itself, pa. 240, vol. 16, of the Journals of the House of Commons;) but upon the common-law remedy being inadequate, and the proofs difficult, to ascertain the damage really suffered by the injurious multiplication of the copies of those books which they had bought and published. And this appears from the case they presented to the members at the time.​[24]​
In a vigorous dissent, Lord Yates stated the following:
After examining the several clauses and expressions contained in it, I can not but conclude that the Legislature had no notion of any such things as copy-rights, as existing for ever at common law: but that, on the contrary, they understood that authors could have no right in their copies after they had made their works public; and meant to give them a security which they supposed them not to have had before. And that this was the idea of the Legislature, is plainly discoverable from the debate before it passed into a law. 
The booksellers petitioned, ‘that they might have their right secured to them.’ The committee expunged that word; and substituted ‘vesting,’ in the place of ‘securing,’ (as it had stood in the original bill:) and the House determined the title should be ‘For the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein Mentioned.’ And afterwards, when the Lords would have struck out the clause restraining the authors with regard to the price, they came to a conference. The Commons said, they thought it reasonable that some provision should be made, ‘that extravagant prices should not be set on useful books.’ And the Lords gave it up. It certainly appeared to the Legislature, that abstractedly from this statute, authors had no exclusive right whatever; and consequently, must be very far from having any pretensions to an eternal monopoly.​[25]​
It is remarkable that debate prior to passage was mentioned explicitly by Lord Yates, despite the fact that publication of parliamentary deliberations was unlawful at the time. He felt entirely comfortable mentioning it without qualification or justification. The law was no impediment. 
Finally, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Mansfield, said the following in his concurring opinion: “[t]he bill was brought in, upon the petition of the proprietors, to secure their property for ever, by penalties; … . An alteration was made in the committee, to restrain the perpetual into a temporary security.”​[26]​ 
All four judges in the panel relied on deliberations in Parliament in their opinions, as gleaned from the journals of proceedings and the bills that were presented at various stages during passage. Mr Justice Willes’ preliminary statement was obiter. This case cannot stand as an authority for the proposition for which it has become famous, nor was it cited by a judge in support for the exclusionary rule prior to 1887, although the case was cited for various procedural and substantive issues throughout the 19th century.​[27]​ In Jefferys v Boosey, in1854, counsel for the defendant said the following: 
The Judges, in construing the 8th of Anne, in Millar v. Taylor, advert to its Parliamentary history, as brought in to secure copyright, and altered in its progress to destroy it. But without going upon such a ground of construction, it is legitimate to observe, from the statute itself, that it appears to have proceeded from the conflicting interests of readers and authors.​[28]​ 
The judges, including Pollock CB and Coleridge B, did not comment on this argument although they cited Millar as an authority for issues pertaining to copyright law.
The first clear judicial statement indicating that the case stood for the exclusionary rule occurred in Caird v Sime in 1887.​[29]​ In dissent, Lord Fitzgerald, stated that “[t]he rule so aptly expressed has always been enforced in this House. But, strangely enough, Willes, J., does, shortly afterwards in the same judgment, seem to offend against his own rule. He uses language which I quote as not inapplicable to the statute before us.”​[30]​ Lord Fitzgerald proceeded to make arguments based on Hansard.​[31]​ Thus, the first reported judicial acknowledgement that Millar v Taylor stood for the exclusionary rule occurred in order to use the case for the opposite purpose.
Whilst one can find cases in which counsel made arguments based on legislative history from the 1760s through to the late 19th century,​[32]​ the typical response was judicial silence—the judges did not acknowledge the argument. The cases were decided on other grounds. One could infer that the judges were following a rule. However, it is difficult to defend the claim that the rule was established by Millar v Taylor. At best, one could assert that around the time after Millar v Taylor the judges appeared to be following a rule. However, lawyers were either unaware of the rule or they felt entirely comfortable disregarding it. It would be equally reasonable to conclude that, in the decades after Millar v Taylor, the judges did not find such arguments compelling for particular reasons in each particular case and chose only to discuss the arguments that were compelling. Judicial economy was the order of the day and most cases do not benefit from arguments based on legislative history.
Had this rule been regarded as an important rule of law, one would expect an explicit enunciation of it to appear in a judgment, at least on occasion. Curiously, there are no statements explicitly sanctioning legislative history prior to the 1834 in England.​[33]​ One can find earlier enunciations of a rule forbidding extrinsic considerations, more generally, for text that yields a plain meaning. For example, there is a copyright (or literary property) case from 1812 in which Lord Ellenborough, CJ said:
The grand rule of construing any statute, as indeed it is the grand rule of construing any instrument, be it statute, be it will, be it deed, is to look into the body of the thing to be construed, and to collect, as far as you can, what is the intrinsic meaning of that thing to be construed, and if that thing be clearly intelligible in reference to its own contents, I should not be inclined to raise a doubt upon the construction drawn aliunde, if I can help it.​[34]​
This is a general exclusionary principle, however, Lord Ellinborough CJ did not indicate whether extrinsic considerations would be permissible if the provision had not been clear; and if so, nor did he indicate which kinds of materials could be considered. This does not amount to a clear statement holding legislative history to be a prohibited consideration under all circumstances.
Had there been a rule against legislative history that had been widely known and strictly followed, one would also expect opposing counsel to object when such arguments were made. The earliest case I was able to find evidencing such behaviour was Shrewsbury (Earl) v Scott from 1859.​[35]​
 4.4 	Arguments in Support of 17th Century Adoption of the Rule
Baade has made one of the most comprehensive defences of the claim that the rule was followed as of Millar v Taylor. He argues that the rule was widely known and strictly followed in both the United States and England as of the late 1700s based primarily on statements made in the debates in the House of Representatives in the 1790s, the notoriety of Millar v Taylor, and a case from the New York Supreme court in 1818.
The debates from the House of Representatives concerned whether or not the president should release documents pertaining to the negotiation of Jay’s Treaty to Congress.​[36]​ Representative Robert Harper stated that it was the “universal practice of Courts of Law, who, when called upon to explain acts of the Legislature, never resorted to the debates which preceded it—to the opinions of members about its signification—but inspected the act itself, and decided by its own evidence.”​[37]​ Similar statements were made by Nathaniel Smith and William Smith during the same debate. Madison expressed the same point in an letter expressing a legal opinion about the constitutionality of a national bank in 1791, although previously when debating the related bill, he had made arguments based on deliberations at the continental congress.​[38]​
Millar v Taylor was an important case at the time in both England and America.​[39]​ Based on its infamy, Baade believes it is reasonable to infer that the famous statement by Mr Justice Willes was known and accepted as law throughout the UK and the post-secession former American colonies. However, the case was regarded as important because of the substantive issues concerning copyright, and one can find extensive substantive analyses of this case which entirely ignore Mr Justice Willes’s statement about statutory interpretation.​[40]​ A straightforward reading of the judgment would leave the impression that Parliamentary deliberations were a permissible consideration rather than a prohibited one. With respect, Baade’s inference is subject to reasonable doubt.
Baade also cites People v Utica Insurance Co,​[41]​ an 1818 case at the New York Supreme Court in which legislative history was explicitly rejected. The insurance company was engaging in banking activities without such powers being granted to it contrary to legislative in place at the time.​[42]​ Counsel for the defendant argued that floor statements and “information out of doors” could not be considered, while the Attorney General argued that, in the quest for legislative intent, there were no fixed rules about what the Court could consider. Chief Justice Thompson for the Majority said the following: “[t]hat in construing a statute, the intention of the legislation is a fit and proper subject of inquiry, is too well settled to admit of dispute. That intention, however, is to be collected from the act itself, and other acts, in pari materia.”​[43]​ Justice Spencer, in dissent, added that “Courts of law cannot consider the motives which may have influenced the legislature, or their intentions, any further than they are manifested by the statute itself.”​[44]​ 
There was also an opinion of the Attorney General in 1823, which had persuasive authority as a quasi-judicial statement.​[45]​ The relevant opinion implied that recourse to legislative history was not allowable when construing public acts by declaring an exception for private acts.​[46]​ Thus there is some evidence suggesting that the exclusionary rule was known by lawyers in the early decades of the 19th century in America. It is curious that the first judgment explicitly evidencing the rule came from a state court five decades after Millar v Taylor.
 4.5 	The Exclusionary Rule in the Treatises on Statutory Interpretation
Sir William Blackstone was counsel for the plaintiff in Millar v Taylor.​[47]​ Thus he was aware of the possibility that legislative history might be used in arguments about the meaning of legislation, yet he chose not to address the matter explicitly in his five rules governing statutory interpretation.​[48]​ It is possible that the rule was simply too fine a point to fit into his commentaries which are broad and thin, so to speak, and therefore lacking in detail. However, the exclusionary rule appeared in neither the first edition of Dwarris’ treatise on statutory interpretation, published in 1831, nor in the second edition, published in 1848.​[49]​ The first clear enunciation of the rule was put forward in Sedgwick’s treatise in 1857.​[50]​ 
Sedgwick commenced his analysis by stating: “[w]e are not to suppose that the courts will receive evidence of extrinsic facts as to the intention of the legislature; that is, of facts which have taken place at the time of, or prior to, the passage of the bill.”​[51]​ In support, he quoted passages from a Pennsylvania State Court judgment from 1856, and from the Court of Appeals in New York from 1852, which stated explicitly that journals of proceedings of the state legislature were not to be considered as evidence of the meaning of statutory provisions.​[52]​ He noted the mischief rule for which “very eminent judges take a sort of judicial cognizance of many extrinsic facts, in regards to which evidence certainly would not have been permitted, and which, indeed, could not perhaps be proved.”​[53]​ He then stated that times have changed, that “the business of legislation has become multifarious and enormous”, resulting in the separation of the judiciary and the legislature; and that “any general theory or loose idea [of legislative intention] … must be dangerous in practice.” He proceeded to cite and discuss a US Supreme Court judgment, five House of Lords judgments, two Queen’s Bench judgments and a Michigan State Court judgment, all setting out variations on the plain meaning rule.​[54]​ He concluded that “for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legislature, no extrinsic fact, prior to the passage of the bill which is not itself a rule of law or an act of legislation, can be inquired into or in any way taken into view.”​[55]​ Sedgwick’s cases are decidedly weak given the strength of his enunciation of the exclusionary principle. In Notely v Buck, for example, Lord Tenterden CJ recited an orthodoxy that contains no suggestion that extrinsic considerations were prohibited: “The proviso is introduced into this Act, for the first time, as an addition to the 103d section of the former statute, 5 G. 4, c. 98. The intention certainly was to prevent voluntary preferences; the words may probably go beyond the intention; but if they do, it rests with the Legislature to make an alteration; the duty of the Court is only to construe and give effect to the provision.”​[56]​ There was no evidence that legislative history was presented in argument. In Brandling v Barrington, Lord Tenterden warned against equitable interpretation using language that comes across as obiter: “Speaking for myself alone, I cannot forbear observing, that I think there is always danger in giving effect to what is called the equity of a statute, and that it is much safer and better to rely on and abide by the plain words, although the Legislature might possibly have provided for other cases had their attention been directed to them.”​[57]​ Similarly tangential statements occur all but the two state court cases in which the rule was explicit.
As will become apparent when the authorities from the later treatises are considered, it seems likely that Sedgwick’s position aligned with the predominant judicial view in the US federal courts around the time his work was published. The picture was less clear in state courts. There is a related point to keep in mind, which is equally relevant to Baade’s reliance on People v Utica Insurance Co: one state court case is rarely evidence of a universal practice among all of the state courts in America. 
The next treatise to be published was by Maxwell in 1875. Maxwell expressed the rule as follows:​[58]​
Reference is occasionally made to what the framers of the Act, or individual members of the Legislature intended to do by the enactment, or understood it to have done.​[59]​ … But the language of an Act can be regarded only as the language of the legislature, and the meaning attached to it by its framers or by members of parliament cannot control the construction of language when it becomes that of the Legislature. The intention of the Legislature can be collected from no other evidence than its own declaration, that is, from the Act itself; and, indeed, if any inference were to be drawn from comparing the language of the Act with that of its framers, it would be that the difference between the two was not accidental but intentional.
Whilst expressing the same principle, Maxwell acknowledged several cases in which inferences were drawn from the framers of statutes—contrary cases—two of which were recent. The case of re Mew and Thorne was downplayed by describing it, not as an exception, but as a case in which the judge called into aid historical facts “to understand the subject-matter and the scope and object of the enactment.”​[60]​ Maxwell noted that Westbury LC cited his own speech introducing the relevant bill to Parliament while disavowing his personal understanding of the words of the statute that resulted from his involvement in its framing. This description ignores the fact that, not only was Hansard relied upon in this case, but also a commissioners’ report, under the mischief rule.​[61]​
In support of his enunciation of the exclusionary rule, Maxwell cited Martin v Hemming, Cameron v Cameron, Hemstead v Phoenix Gas Co and Selkeld v Johnson.​[62]​
Martin v Hemming is an unusual choice as an authority. A commissioners report was submitted by counsel, but the motion for leave was settled on procedural grounds. Substantive argument was not discussed by the judge.​[63]​ It is odd to suggest that this case supports a general, substantive rule. 
In Hemstead, counsel argued that “the intention of the Commissioners, in recommending the change effected by this section … seem … to be scarcely borne out by the passage in the Report.” The judgment, per curiam, contained a single sentence: “In the language of the Act of Parliament there is no such limitation as that contended for; consequently there shall be no rule.” There was no suggestion that the report was an impermissible consideration. As with Martin v Hemming, it seems a stretch to draw a broad, general rule from this particular case. 
Cameron v Cameron is a stronger authority. In a motion, counsel for the plaintiff sought an order to serve a subpoena to the defendant in Scotland, in accordance with the Service of Process out of the Jurisdiction Acts of 1832 and 1834. These statues enabled the court to make such order in “the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.”​[64]​ Counsel for the defendant discussed a motion heard by the “Late Lord Chancellor,” Lord Brougham, who “intimated that it was not the intention of Lord Plunkett, under whose auspices the measure was brought into Parliament, to extend its provisions to Scotland, and that such an extension would amount to a virtual repeal of one of the Articles of the Union.”​[65]​ Lord Lyndhurst LC began his ruling by stating “What Lord Plunkett intended is, for the purpose of construing the Act, immaterial, for the words of the Act must speak for themselves.”​[66]​ The Lord Chancellor found the relevant provisions to be clear, and it is not obvious that this very brief ruling went beyond the plain meaning rule. This case can be regarded as a dialogue of sorts with the case of M’Master v Lomax, heard one year earlier. The relevant section of the report reads as follows:
THE LORD CHANCELLOR [Brougham] said that, although the words of the enactment were certainly large and comprehensive, he entertained no doubt whatever that the statute in question had never been intended or supposed to apply to North Britain. The measure had been submitted to Parliament on the suggestion of Lord Plunkett, whose object was (as might be collected from a comparison of the first and second sections) to make the process of the respective Courts of Equity in England and Ireland run interchangeably in all cases where the lands, the subject of the suit, were situated in the one country, and the Defendants sought to be affected by it resided in the other. If the statute were to be construed in the manner contended for, it would amount to a virtual repeal of one of the provisions in the Articles of Union, although Scotland was never once mentioned by name in any part of the Act. Under the circumstances, he should be most reluctant to accede to that construction.​[67]​
Given that the intention was gleaned from the provisions of the statute, and Lord Brougham’s concern was with respect to the Articles of Union which he was regarding as statutes in pari materia, counsel mischaracterised the case in Cameron v Cameron.
Salkeld v Johnson​[68]​ was an authority that clearly evidenced an exclusionary rule. A vicar alleged that he was due tythes, and the defendants claimed to be exempt because of s 1 of An Act for shortening the Time required in Claims of Modus Decimandi, or Exemption from or Discharge of Tithes.​[69]​ Counsel sought to rely on the recommendations in a report of the Real Property commissioners, which preceded the Act. In the words of Tindall J, “we are not at liberty to infer the intention of the legislature from any other evidence than the construction of the act itself.”​[70]​ 
Three of the cases cited dealt with commissioners’ reports, despite the fact that Maxwell specifically named “framers” and individual members of parliament when describing the rule. For Maxwell, the matter as governed by a single principle: commissioners’ reports and debates in the Houses were alike. Maxwell had a stronger collection of authorities than Sedgwick, however, he did not mention the strongest authorities that were available. There was a knowledge gap of sorts. 
Hardcastle’s treatise, which morphed in to Craies in its fourth edition, was the next treatise to be published. It devoted several pages to the issue of legislative history, beginning as follows:
There is one matter which is not allowable to refer to in discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment, and that is what is sometimes called ‘the Parliamentary history’ of a statute, that is to say, the debates which took place in Parliament when the statute was under consideration; and the alterations made in it during its passage through committee, are ‘wisely inadmissible to explain it.’​[71]​ 
The “wisely inadmissible” phrase was a quotation from Lord Coleridge CJ in R v Hertford College:​[72]​
We are not, however, concerned with what parliament intended, but simply with what it has said in the statute. The statute is clear, and the parliamentary history is wisely inadmissible to explain it if it is not; but in this case, if it could be referred to, it would appear beyond all controversy Parliamentum voluisse quod dicit lex. [Parliament intended what the law says].
Note that this case is from 1878, relatively late in the century. No authority was cited for the notion of inadmissibility, and it was a concept that rarely arose earlier in the century.​[73]​
In support of his claim about reference and admissibility, Hardcastle also cited Green v The Queen. This prolix case was settled via plain meaning in response to two clever arguments, one based on contra proferentem, and the other based on the need for strong express language to abrogate pre-existing rights. Counsel for the defendant opened by saying
this is a private Act of Parliament, and was passed at the instance of the patron and the rector, the people of March not being parties to it. It is not, therefore, without strong and imperative reasons, to be construed adversely to them. Nor ought any of the rights they enjoyed previously to its passing to be abrogated, except by clear and express words.”
Lord Hatherley noted that there had been “a litigation some sixty years before the passing of the Act with reference to the election of churchwardens at this very place, March—in relation to the controversy which now exists. ... it could not be supposed that it was the intention of the Act to alter, by indirect means, the rights which had been ascertained and declared as between the rector and the inhabitants as to the appointment of churchwardens[.]​[74]​
This is not a strong case for the summary rejection of the kinds of arguments put forward by counsel. The arguments were considered at length by the judges on the panel. Lord Hatherly said “I was struck, I confess, during the argument, also by the observations of the learned Judges to the effect that it was necessary to consider whether any other construction was open, and if so, whether under the circumstances which attended the passing of the Act of Parliament that other construction ought to take effect.” In the end, the judges found the arguments insufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the statute. Lord Chelmsford put it this way: “The argument for the exception of March from the provision as to the appointment of churchwardens is founded merely on implication, which cannot in my opinion prevail against the rights expressly and clearly conferred … by the 5th section of the Act.”​[75]​ Upon a full reading, one is not left with the impression that such arguments were illegitimate and subject to summary dismissal in the future.
Hardcastle also quoted Pollock CB in Attorney General v Sillem:​[76]​ 
No Court can construe any statute, and least of all a criminal statute, by what counsel are pleased to suggest, were alterations made in committee by a Member of Parliament, who was ‘no friend of the Bill,’ even though the Journals of the House should give some sanction to the proposition. This is not one of the modes of discovering the meaning of an Act of Parliament recommended by Plowden, or sanctioned by Lord Coke or Blackstone.
This is a very clear enunciation of the rule in 1863, although the impugned materials were obviously admitted. It is interesting to note that Bramwell B quoted Sedgwick: 
it is no doubt a penal statute, but I think it ought to be construed as laid down by Sedgewick in his Book on Statutory and Constitutional Law. He says at p. 326 ‘But the rule that statutes of this class are to be considered strictly, is far from being a rigid or unbending one; or rather, it has in modern times been so modified and explained away, as to mean little more than that penal provisions, like all others, are to be fairly construed according to the legislative intent as expressed in the enactment … .’​[77]​ 
American treatises were influential in England at this time.
The reference to Coke, Plowden and Blackstone is significant. This was the closest that any English judge came to citing authority for the exclusionary rule at this time. 
Hardcastle cited none of the cases cited by Sedgwick and only a few of the cases cited by Maxwell in support of his claims about the exclusionary rule. Hardcastle also chose to address commissioners’ reports separately from proceedings in the Houses.​[78]​ He cited Selkeld v Johnson​[79]​ and Farley v Bonham​[80]​ for the proposition that it was not “usual to refer to any reports of commissioners or such like documents, to which the enactment may be supposed to owe its origin.”​[81]​ The choice of words is rather nuanced given the strong statement by Tindal CJ in Selkeld v Johnson, although this was perhaps influenced by Lord Denman’s reliance on a commissioners’ report in Fellows v Clay.​[82]​
 Hardcastle’s distinction between commissioners’ reports and proceedings in Parliament was apt. The exclusionary rule would developed in a manner that distinguished between these two sources and treated them differently in the 20th century.​[83]​ Meanwhile, with the cases put forward by Hardcastle, the exclusionary rule was supported only by compelling cases, and thus it reached something akin to scholarly maturity.
Wilberforce’s treatise explained the issue in a more comprehensive and detailed fashion:​[84]​ 
‘[w]e cannot aid the Legislature’s defective phrasing of the Act’ said Lord Brougham, in words similar to those which had been used by Lord Eldon [in Weale v West Middlesex Waterworks Co (1820) 1 Jac & Walk, 371]; … ‘we cannot add and mend and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there.’
For the same reason the intention of the Legislature is not to be inferred from any external evidence. If a statute is not clearly worded, its Parliamentary history is ‘wisely inadmissible’ to explain it. The Court cannot consider what was the intention of the member of Parliament by whom any measure was introduced. It cannot look at the reports of commissions which preceded the passing of statutes, and upon which those statutes were founded. … The Court cannot look at the history of a clause, or of the introduction of a proviso, nor at debates in Parliament, nor at amendments and alterations made in Committee, nor at the principles which govern the Houses of Parliament in passing private bills, nor at the policy of the Government with reference to any particular legislation.
Wilberforce cited most of the cases cited by Maxwell and Hardcastle. He apparently searched his competitors’ works for authorities. However, Wilberforce also cited a number of additional cases that had not appeared in the prior works.
One interesting case that Wilberforce brought to light is Barbat v Allen.​[85]​ In this case, Pollock CB stated: 
Lord Truro, in one of his judgments, explains how the third section of the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, came to be so framed. But while I allude to the subject, I must at the same time state, that the history of a clause in a statute is certainly no ground for its interpretation in a Court of Law; and I would guard myself against being considered as resorting to any such means.​[86]​ 
Judgment was rendered in 1852, five years before Sedgwick’s work was published.
The second edition of Maxwell’s treatise, published in 1883, contained citations to R v Hertford College, and to Pollock CB and Bramwell B in Sillem. These two cases were becoming canonical English authorities for the rule. It seems likely that Maxwell learned about these cases from Hardcastle’s or Wilberforce’s treatise. The wording and authorities in Maxwell would be repeated without significant revision through to the eleventh edition, published in 1962. Maxwell continued to cite Hemstead and Martin v Hemming, which dealt with commissioners’ reports, and thus continued to assert that these various types of documents were governed by a single principle.
What one observes in this series of treatises is a belief, commencing with Sedgwick, that the exclusionary rule was good law, and there was a quest for more and better authorities in support. Sedgwick was not aware of the best cases in England, and nor was Maxwell. Indeed, to a large extent, the rule against legislative history was inferred based upon cases in which legislative history was not dealt with. It was in the treatises by Hardcastle and Wilberforce that one finds a robust set of cases appropriate for a rule as broad and strong as the exclusionary rule.
Based on the available cases in England, the earliest explicit support for the exclusionary rule is in Cameron v Cameron in 1834. In light of this, it is perhaps understandable that the rule was absent from Dwarris’ first edition in 1831. There were few published cases that provided good support for the rule, and it is possible that the rule was not well-known at the time. Meanwhile, with the benefit of 17 years of reflection, the rule was not added in Dwarris’ 2nd edition. This treatise was long and rich in detail. One must either believe that Dwarris was remiss and failed to note a rule that was widely known and regarded as important; or one must accept the possibility that the rule was either not so widely known or not held to be important by some prominent lawyers in England in 1848.
Based on Lord Fitzgerald’s statement in Caird v Sime,​[87]​ it appears that late in the 19th century some members of the English judiciary believed that the rule commenced with Millar v Taylor. However, there are no reported cases suggesting that such an understanding was held by judges or lawyers earlier in the century, although the case was cited frequently for a variety of other substantive and procedural matters for more than a century after it was decided. Given that judges never cited cases in support of the exclusionary rule, the question of whether or not judges were following a rule was likely not determined by precedent. It is therefore an empirical matter. It is possible that some or most of the senior judges in England decided that reliance on legislative history was a bad idea in the wake of Millar v Taylor and started following the rule. If this was the case, they did not feel compelled to make their decision explicit in a case.
 4.6 	The Decline of the Exclusionary Rule in America
Bishop penned a treatise that was published in 1882,​[88]​ and his enunciation of the exclusionary rule followed a trend that had occurred in the English treatises. Over time, the explanation was expanding to cover more detail, and there was an accumulation of stronger authorities in support. However, in the US, cases evidencing exceptions to the rule were also accumulating: 
Excepting as thus explained, and inquiring for what may control the interpretation, the rule of law is distinct, that the courts cannot resort to the opinions of the individual legislators, the legislative journals, the reports of committees, or the speeches made at the time an act was passed.​[89]​
Bishop cited the same cases as Sedgwick in support, and thus put emphasis on the plain meaning rule as the primary reason for rejecting legislative history. However, Aldridge v Williams was also cited.​[90]​ In this US Supreme Court case, Taney, CJ explicitly rejected legislative history: 
In expounding this law, the judgment of the court cannot, in any degree, be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself; and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.​[91]​
This case was decided in 1845, more than a decade before Sedgwick’s treatise was published, yet it was not cited by him; nor was it cited in the second edition, revised by Pomoroy.​[92]​ Apparently neither Sedgwick nor Pomoroy were aware of this case.
The exceptions as explained by Bishop included the following: 
it is evidently proper for them [ie judges] to look, if they choose, into discussions by lawyers in the legislative body, the views of the draughtsman of a bill, of the revisers of statutes, and of the legislature passing an act. As authority, this sort of matter is not admissible. As opinion to persuade, it varies with the particular circumstances.”​[93]​ 
This was an explicit, general exception to the rule. The claim was supported by several state court cases​[94]​ and United States v Union Pacific Railroad,​[95]​ a Supreme Court case in which the rule against floor statements was upheld strictly.
Endlich published an annotated version Maxwell’s treatise that was adapted to the American legal community in 1888.​[96]​ He was more conservative with respect to the rule. He affirmed Maxwell’s claim that the parliamentary history could not be referred to, however, he also cited several contrary cases including a US Supreme Court case and several state court cases in which the original bill and amendments made in the legislature were relied upon to determine the meaning of obscure statutory text.​[97]​ He noted that the rule against recourse to commissioners reports which prevailed in England “seems to be the same in this country, although perhaps not followed with universal consistency.”​[98]​ Endlich cited two state court cases in support, and two to the contrary.​[99]​ 
Sutherland took the view that debates were impermissible whilst committee reports and similar documents could be considered: “if the reasons and objects of the law are made known by any other document equally authentic and certain, as the report of one of the heads of departments, it may be referred to to aid in the interpretation of doubtful or ambiguous language in the law.”​[100]​ This principle was supported by a Federal Circuit Court judgement, an English case and four state court cases.​[101]​ Sutherland added that “[t]here has been occasional judicial reference to declarations of members of legislative bodies, but such aids are but slightly relied upon, and the general current of authority is opposed to any resort to such aids.” This latter point was buttressed by the classic English cases, several state cases plus Aldridge v Williams. 
Within a period of nine years, Bishop, Endlich and Sutherland put forward divergent points of view about the exclusionary rule in America. This was likely the result of the accumulating exceptions in the reports. At the US Supreme Court, Madison’s notes from Records of the Federal Conventions were cited and relied upon to determine the meaning of “ex post facto clauses” in the Constitution in Carpenter v Pennsylvania in 1854:​[102]​ 
The debates in the federal convention upon the Constitution show that the terms ‘ex post facto laws’ were understood in a restricted sense, relating to criminal cases only, and that the description of Blackstone of such laws was referred to for their meaning. 3 Mad. Pap. 1399, 1450, 1579.
Floor statements and a committee report were relied upon in Dubuque & Pacific Railroad v Litchfield in 1859.​[103]​ It was held that floor statements were “entitled to respect as some authority for the meaning of words actually used in the enactment.” In 1875 changes made to a bill as it moved through Congress were relied upon in Blake v National Bank,​[104]​ and a Senate Finance Committee report was referred to in Arthur v Richards.​[105]​ In the same year, the rule against floor statements was upheld in United States v Union Pacific Railroad Co.​[106]​ Three years later, in the unanimous decision in Jennison v Kirk, Field J relied on floor statements by the “author of the act” to interpret provisions of the two statutes governing the terms of bond financing for railroad construction.​[107]​
These statements of the author of the act in advocating its adoption cannot, of course, control its construction where there is doubt as to its meaning, but they show the condition of mining property on the public lands of the United States and the tenure by which it was held by miners in the absence of legislation on the subject, and thus serve to indicate the probable intention of Congress in the passage of the act.​[108]​
In American Net & Twine Co v Worthington the dispute concerned whether linen thread imported to manufacture fishing nets was it taxable as “linen thread” or as “gilling twine” under the Tariff Act 1883.​[109]​ Floor statements were held to be inadmissible as an aid to construction, but permissible “to inform the court of the exigencies of the fishing interests and the reasons for fixing the duty at this amount”.​[110]​ 
Church of the Holy Trinity v United States​[111]​ was a unanimous decision concerning an act prohibiting “the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States[.]”​[112]​ The Church had contracted to bring a rector from England. Brewer J relied on US v Union Pacific Railway Co (and the rule against absurdity) to justify extensive recourse to legislative history including floor statements.​[113]​ He held that “labor” did not include those who laboured with their minds, such as priests. 
United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association​[114]​ concerned whether or not an association of freight carriers operated in restraint of trade, contrary to the Trust Act.​[115]​ Counsel for the defendant presented extensive extracts from the debates in Congress. Peckham J stated:​[116]​ 
All that can be determined from the debates and reports is that various members had various views, and we are left to determine the meaning of this act, as we determine the meaning of other acts, from the language used therein.
There is, too, a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the language of a statute passed by that body.​[117]​
Given this series of cases, it is understandable that different scholars might reach different conclusions concerning the rule. It would be fair to conclude that the law was unsettled in the Federal Courts in the 1880s.
Conflicting cases had begun to accumulate several decades earlier in the state courts. Chancellor Walworth considered New York Senate and Assembly journals in Coutant v People in 1833.​[118]​ Constitutional convention proceedings were relied upon with respect to the state constitution in Clark v People​[119]​ in 1841, and in People v Purdy​[120]​ in 1842. The journals of the state senate were relied upon to interpret a statute in State v McCollister​[121]​ in 1842. Purdy was cited with approval by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Pacific Rail Road v Sibley​[122]​ and by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in State v Cloksey​[123]​ in 1858. In light of these decisions, it is difficult to maintain the claim that the exclusionary rule was followed universally in state courts by the 1840s. Based upon these authorities, Cooley made the following claim in 1868: 
When the inquiry is directed to ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. These proceedings ... are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.​[124]​
Returning to the treatises on statutory interpretation, recall that Bishop, Endlich and Sutherland had each put forward a different description of the state of the law concerning the exclusionary rule. The next treatise by Black, published in 1896, concurred with Sutherland’s position: committee reports and journals could be consulted but floor debates could not. Black said the following about journals and reports: 
An obscure or ambiguous law is often rendered clear and intelligible by a consideration of the various steps which led to its final passage, as shown by the journals of the legislative body, and a resort to these sources of information by the courts, in the endeavor to ascertain the intention of the legislature and interpret the statute accordingly, is sanctioned by the great majority of the decisions.
This claim was supported primarily by state court cases.​[125]​ 
The second edition of Sutherland’s treatise, in 1904, repeated the claim: reports and journals could be considered but floor statements could not. However, Black’s second edition in 1911 contained two significant additions. With respect to the rule permitting reliance on journals and committee reports, Black said “[t]he doctrine above stated does not pass entirely without contradiction [ie there are cases indicating that these materials cannot be considered.] … But these decisions are opposed to the weight of authority.” The list of cases evidencing judicial reliance on such materials had grown significantly.​[126]​ With respect to floor statements and debates, a significant exception was added: “The opinion of a member of the legislature, if he be a man of learning and of acute and discriminating intelligence, may be of quite as much persuasive force as the opinion of a judge delivered in a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.” With these changes, Black was conceding that there was no longer an exclusionary rule in the US.
Some, including Justice Scalia, have asserted that the exclusionary rule was followed in the US until several decades into the 20th century.​[127]​ In light of the foregoing this assertion is difficult to accept. The exceptions began to accumulate in the state courts in the 1830s, and in the federal courts in the 1850s. By the turn of the 20th century there were many judges willing to cite and rely on legislative history. The American treatise authors were more conservative than Cooley in their assessment of the significance of the exceptions; but however one regards them, it is difficult to argue that there was any substance remaining to the exclusionary rule in America by the time of Black’s second edition.
 4.7 	Disagreement about the Exclusionary Rule in England
In the final decade of the 19th century, there was also uncertainty about the state of the exclusionary rule in England. The second edition of Hardcastle’s treatise, which was edited by Craies and published in 1892, contained a significant revision with respect to Hansard: “until very recently, it was never allowable to refer to [the parliamentary history] in discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment[.]”​[128]​ The direct implication was that it had become permissible to do so. Two cases were cited in support.​[129]​ 
In R v Bishop of Oxford, the matter concerned whether it was mandatory or whether the Bishop had discretion to order an investigation into alleged wrongs under s 3 of the Church Discipline Act.​[130]​ Bramwell​[131]​ and Baggallay LJJ cited a speech of the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords as an authority. In a footnote, Craies noted that this judgment was criticized by Earl Cairns and Lord Selborne when the case was affirmed by the House of Lords on appeal.​[132]​ 
In SE Railway, the lawfulness of an order by the Railway Commissioners compelling the corporation responsible for several train stations to upgrade the facilities under the authority of the Railway and Traffic Act 1854 was challenged.​[133]​ Cockburn CJ said, “[w]here the meaning of an Act is doubtful, we are, I think, at liberty to recur to the circumstances under which it was passed into law as a means of solving the difficulty[.]”​[134]​ He relied on proceedings in committee and speeches introducing the relevant Bill into the House of Commons and the House of Lords.​[135]​ 
With respect to commissioners’ reports, Craies moved in the opposite direction. The soft language, indicating that it was “not usual” to refer to such materials, was removed. Instead, Craies recited quotations from Rankin v Lamone and Salkeld v Johnson, and claimed that such materials were “scarcely legitimate” and irrelevant.​[136]​ In a footnote, Craies noted that the treatment of commissioners’ reports was inconsistent with treatment of Hansard. Craies believed that all such materials should be governed by a single principle; however, he bowed to the principle of strong stare decisis which was embraced at the time.​[137]​
The Bishop of Oxford case provides insight into the procedural workings and the judicial understandings of the exclusionary rule at that time.​[138]​ The judges and counsel agreed that there was a rule against the use legislative history as an aid to statutory construction. A party sought to present legislative history, the opposing counsel objected, and counsel was permitted to explain why the material should be admitted. These materials were being treated as inadmissible at this time.​[139]​ It was argued that the material did not touch on interpretation of the provision at issue and the material was admitted, presumably under the mischief exception. There was a precedent for this proposition, although it was not mentioned in the judgment.​[140]​
It turned out that the materials did relate to interpretation, and Bramwell LJ asserted that the statement of a prominent jurist in a House of Parliament should have more authority than the passing dictum from a judge at Nisi Prius. He added, “I really do not know that there is any definite rule as to what may or may not be cited and acted on as authority.”​[141]​ Bagallay LJ expressed doubt about whether the materials should have been admitted, but felt that recourse to statements by living jurists in Parliament were no different, in principle, from opinions by living jurists in textbooks, which were admitted and relied upon at that time.​[142]​ These statements were significant judicial challenges to the rule by prominent judges.
The third edition of Maxwell’s treatise was published in 1896, and it contained almost no changes with respect to extrinsic aids to interpretation.​[143]​ It maintained that legislative history and commissioners’ reports were inadmissible under a single principle.​[144]​ The same cases were cited in support. However, the third edition of Hardcastle’s treatise, published in 1901, pushed the divergence even further. Craies continued to assert that reference could be made to “the parliamentary history” of a statute when interpreting a statutory provision. However, with respect to commissioners’ reports, Craies claimed it was “now established that reference may be made to previous statutes in pari materia, and to reports on their effect and defects.”​[145]​ He cited Eastman Photographic Materials Company v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks​[146]​ as the main authority. In this case Halsbury LC said: “I think no more accurate source of information as to what was the evil or defect which the Act of Parliament now under construction was intended to remedy could be imagined than the report of that commission.”​[147]​ Lords Herschell, MacNaghten, Morris and Shand, concurred.​[148]​ This was a unanimous decision by the House of Lords. 
	With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to disregard the uncertainty surrounding the exclusionary rule in England in the final decade of the 19th century. However, with exceptions accumulating in the US, and with prominent appellate court judges challenging the rule in England, there was room for specialists in the field to arrive at contrary points of view. 
 4.8 	The Arrival of Scholarly Consensus
	At the turn of the 20th century, the case law militated in favour of the exclusionary rule. Judgments that upheld the rule outnumbered judgments that did not; legislative history was being treated as inadmissible in the absence of justification;​[149]​ and judgments that relied on legislative history were becoming the target of judicial criticism at the House of Lords. The secondary literature also weighed in favour of the exclusionary rule: Beal published the first edition of Cardinal Rules of Interpretation in 1896, which addressed the topic via separate sections entitled “Commission Reports” and “Debates In Parliament.” Both sections supported the textualist view.​[150]​
The fourth edition of Hardcastle, published in 1907, marked a return to the textualist position.​[151]​ It was called On Statute Law by William Feilden Craies, with a subtitle indicating that it was “founded on and being the fourth edition of Hardcastle on Statutory Law.”​[152]​ The work stated plainly that “[i]t is not permissible in discussing the meaning of an obscure enactment, to refer to ‘the parliamentary history’ of a statute.”​[153]​ The canonical cases cited in authority included Sillem, R v Hertford College, and Herron v Rathmines.​[154]​ However, there was one new cases added as an authority: R v West Riding of Yorkshire County Council.​[155]​
West Riding appears to be a case that influenced Craies to change his mind about the exclusionary rule. This case would be become another canonical authority for the exclusionary rule and it would be cited by scholars for decades to come.​[156]​ It was best known for the opinion of Farwell LJ: 
it was suggested that the view taken by us of the Act is not in accordance with the intention of the House of Commons or with public understanding of the effect of the Act; and reference was attempted to be made to the debates and to passive resisters; but we have only to deal with the construction of the Act as printed and published. That is the final word of the legislature as a whole, and the antecedent debates and subsequent statements of opinion or belief are not admissible. But they would be quite untrustworthy in any case. In the case of an Act dealing with a controversial subject ambiguous phrases are often used designedly, each side hoping to have thereby expressed its own view, and the belief of each that it has succeeded is more often due to the wish than to any effort of reason. … The principles of construction applicable to Acts of Parliament are well settled, and will be found stated in Stradling v Morgan,​[157]​ and which has received approval of Turner LJ, in Hawkins v Gathercole,​[158]​ and of Lord Halsbury in Eastman Photographic Materials v Comptroller-General of Patents,​[159]​ and do not admit of any such considerations. The Court must, of course, in construing an Act of Parliament, as in construing a deed or will, do its best to put itself in the position of the authors of the words to be interpreted at the time when such words were written or otherwise become effectual; but this will no more justify us in admitting, as evidence on the construction of an Act, speeches in either House or subsequent statements in the public papers, or elsewhere, of the effect of an Act than it would justify us in admitting on the construction of a will the advice given to the testator by his solicitor before, or the statements of himself or his expectant legatees of the effect of his will, after he has made it. The mischief to be cured by the Act, and the aim and object of the Act must be sought in the Act itself. Although it may, perhaps, be legitimate to call history in aid to show what facts existed to bring about a statute, the inferences to be drawn therefrom are extremely slight, as is pointed out by Bramwell, B. in Attorney-General v Sillem … . I think that the true rule is expressed with accuracy by Lord Langdale in giving judgment of the Privy Council in the Gorham Case, in Moore, in 1852 edition, p. 462:​[160]​ ‘We must endeavour to attain for ourselves the true meaning of the language employed [in the Articles and Liturgy], assisted only by the consideration of such external or historical facts as we may find necessary to enable us to understand the subject-matter to which the instruments relate, and the meaning of the words employed’.​[161]​
As with Sillem, and indeed, by incorporating Sillem, this passage about the interpretative practices of English judges emphasised tradition. It called upon history a rhetorical justification for methods employed, which were purported to be centuries old—dating back to Stradding v Morgan in 1560—and approved by all the great legal scholars from the past. Even those judges who had challenged the exclusionary rule, Bramwell J and Lord Halsbury, were included. This was another example of textualist revisionism.
It is significant that the Solio case was cited as an authority. The case was not invoked to support the notion of recourse to commissioners’ reports. To the contrary, it was cited for the proposition that speeches in the House ought not to be considered. By saying that it “may, perhaps, be legitimate” to consider commissioners’ reports, “but the inferences to be drawn therefrom are extremely slight … ,” it appears that Lord Justice Farwell was attempting to downplay the Solio case. This was perhaps the only way forward for a judge who felt strongly about the exclusionary rule in an era of strong stare decisis when faced with a contrary case from the House of Lords. There was no point in denying admissibility, so Farwell argued that such materials should not be given weight.
The length of this passage is revealing. It was, and continues to be, unusual for anything more than a few sentences to be said about statutory interpretation in a judgment. Both parties sought to present commissioners’ reports and Hansard in West Riding, so the issue was before the court. That such materials were regarded as suitable by counsel suggests that the cases which caused Craies to revise his stance about the rule had also been embraced by some lawyers as well. Farwell’s apparent objective was to set matters straight with regard to the exclusionary rule with the strongest rhetorical statements he could muster within the confines of a judicial opinion.
Craies’s treatise did not revert completely to an alignment with Maxwell, however. Despite the comments in West Riding, Craies chose to embrace the Solio case with respect to commissioners’ reports, and relied on it to claim that “[i]t is now generally agreed that reference may be made to reports on the effect and defects of previous statutes in pari materiâ.”​[162]​ The Hardcastle/Craies treatise would remain opposed by Maxwell and Beale on this point for decades.​[163]​
 4.9 	Conclusion
The predominant belief has been that the exclusionary rule was established in England and America by Millar v Taylor, and it was followed strictly since that time through to the 20th century. However, when one looks at the cases and secondary literature over the course of the 19th century, a more complex picture emerges. One finds, instead, a rule that develops from a general, vague and often implicit principle in the late 18th century into a relatively clear rule prohibiting judicial reliance and restricting admission by counsel in the second half of the 19th century. Furthermore, one finds a different timeline for the decline of the rule in the state courts, the US federal courts and the courts of England. The rule was challenged then set aside in several state courts relatively early in the 19th century whilst challenge and decline began in the second half of the 19th century in the federal courts. The rule persisted well into the 20th century in English courts, however, the rule underwent a period of judicial challenge in the final decades of the 19th century during which time the law became unsettled from the perspective of lawyers and scholars. 
The reported cases suggest that the rule was followed widely but not universally in England and in the federal courts in America throughout most of the 19th century. Throughout the time that the rule persisted, there were occasional contrary cases from top-tier courts, some of which were downplayed or overlooked by the treatise-writers. Meanwhile, there was a lag in the treatises with respect to the authorities cited. A very strong and clear rule was put forward by treatise authors from Sedgwick through to Wilberforce (excepting Cooley), however, Sedgwick was unaware of the best cases available when he wrote his treatise. Sedgwick was also unaware of the contrary cases in the state courts. It took three more treatises over the course of two decades for the strongest authorities to be cited both in England and in America. It was another decade before Cooley brought to light the situation in the state courts. However, both Cooley and Sedgwick failed to appreciate that the state and federal courts could diverge with respect to the rule.
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